

21-41471

27 July 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Plans  
Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Security in the CIA Historical Program

1. Recently I reviewed with the Chief of the CIA Historical Staff, the security system in effect in the Agency Historical Program. I asked him to examine the present system with members of his staff and with the Office of Security, and to recommend additional security measures if they seemed warranted.

2. Dr. Ehrmann describes the current system in the attached statement. He points out that a control system has been in effect from the beginning of the Program; that responsibility for safeguarding a history rests with the component in which the history originates; and that dissemination is strictly limited, and is controlled by the component of origin.

3. As a result of our review, it appears that there are three respects in which the security of the Historical Program can be strengthened. These are:

a. Introduction of semi-annual audits of histories. In January and July of each year, each component will send to the Chief of the Historical Staff, through the component and directorate historical officers, (1) an inventory of all histories for which the component is responsible, showing the location of each, including all copies and drafts, and (2) a list of names of all readers, since the last report, with their components.

b. Destruction or registration of all draft manuscripts. Normally all preliminary, partial, and final drafts of manuscripts will be destroyed when a history has been approved. If there is good reason for preserving a draft this may be done, provided that in each instance the draft is registered in the same way as an extra copy of a finished history and is included in the semi-annual audit.

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c. Extra copies of published histories. Where copies in excess of the four which are now allowed are desired, permission to make them must be secured from the deputy director or his designee of the directorate of origin of the history. The Historical Staff must be notified, so that its records may be adjusted, and the extra copies must be registered and entered in the list of completed histories held by the component of origin. These extra copies will be included in the semi-annual report.

4. I have asked the Chief of the Historical Staff to issue instructions to all historical officers and writers calling for a semi-annual inventory of all histories with a list of readers, the destruction or registration of all drafts and partial drafts, and authorization to produce extra copies of histories, which must also be registered.

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L. K. White  
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

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71-4147

The Security System at Present  
in Effect in the CIA Historical Program

1. A control system has been in effect from the beginning of the Program. Each history is assigned a project number as soon as the topic is accepted, and receives a publication number when it has been completed and approved. For histories in the Directorates for Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Support, the record is maintained by the Senior Editor of the Historical Staff. In the Directorate for Plans, the record is kept by the CS Control Officer of the Historical Staff. All published histories and those that have been completed in draft, but have not been found acceptable for publication, are entered in the Source Document Index by the Historical Staff Documents Officer. In addition, the four Historical Officers of the Historical Staff keep detailed records of all projects in their directorates.

2. Responsibility for the safeguarding of a history while in draft form, and of all notes, outlines, and documents used in its preparation, rests with the writer and the component in which the history is being produced. This responsibility passes to the Historical Staff only while a manuscript is undergoing review and revision by the Staff. Responsibility for the security of a published history rests with the custodian of that history, as also for the security of all extra copies, drafts, source documents, or backup materials in its possession.

3. At least two copies of a history are made. The ribbon copy is given to the component in which the history was produced, and a xerox copy goes to the deputy director of the directorate of origin or his designee. In the Directorate for Intelligence and the Directorate for Support another xerox copy is frequently made, except in the case of quite sensitive histories. This second xerox copy is kept in the Secure Room of the Historical Staff, where it is available only to Chief, Deputy Chief, Senior Editor, Documents Officer, and the historical officer of the directorate in which the history was produced. It is available to readers only on the authorization of the component or directorate of origin. In a few instances a third xerox copy may be made where two components were involved in the production of the history.

4. Dissemination of histories is quite limited. Control over a history rests with the component of origin and the directorate of which it is a part, either of which may grant permission to read the history. The usual procedure for securing access to a history is to ask permission of the historical officer of the component of origin.

5. All custodians of histories are expected to maintain a record of their holdings and a circulation log of all readers, with titles of the histories read and the dates of reading. At present the Clandestine

Service alone of the directorates requires that an inventory be made, annually, by all components of the histories which are in their possession, and a list on readers be submitted semi-annually by components. These reports are sent to the DDP Historical Officer.

6. Increasingly components want extra copies of histories, beyond the four that are now permitted, for training or briefing purposes, or to reach a wider audience in the belief that something valuable is to be gained from having the information and experience in a particular history more generally known. In all such cases permission to make extra copies must be secured from the deputy director of the directorate of origin or his designee, and the Historical Staff must be informed.

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Howard M. Ehrmann  
Chief, CIA Historical Staff